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I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is the drama of David and Goliath as well as David versus David on the 
water.  West African fishing communities operating in small boats compete 
regularly with both multinational industrial trawlers and each other for an 
ever-dwindling fish supply.  Marine resource scarcity is becoming the new 
reality.  The presence of multilaterally negotiated legal rights to fish coupled 
with the absence of law enforcement across the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) has created a dwindling fish supply across West Africa.  In some of 
these countries, including Liberia, Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea, and Ghana, 
non-governmental organizations estimate that nearly one-third of the total 
catch being taken is illegal.2  When you add in the assumption that fishing 
vessels with licenses may be overfishing without legal repercussions, there 
are tremendous pressures on an increasingly fragile resource for which there 
is no immediate substitute.  
The problem of illegal fishing is not unique to West Africa, but because 
the issues of food security and ecological vulnerability are particularly 
pronounced in this part of the world, Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated 
(IUU) fishing requires a rapid, multi-scale national, regional, and 
international response to avert potentially devastating stock collapses.  
Worldwide fisheries are in crisis, with insufficient international interventions 
to restore commercial fisheries.3  While there has been some international 
attention given to restoring global high seas fisheries and improving regional 
fisheries management,  there is an even more pressing need for rapid local 
interventions to protect subsistence fishers, primarily in developing 
countries, from the consequences of multinational industrial fishing that 
competes directly or indirectly with the subsistence fishing communities in 
EEZs.4  Mirroring the land-grabbing by large agribusiness in Africa, a 
number of non-African vessels—including European and Chinese fishing 
fleets—are presently engaged in ocean-grabbing, reaping large benefits from 
                                                                                                                   
 2 John Vidal, West African Fishing Communities Drive Off ‘Pirate’ Fishing Trawlers, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/oct/11/west-africa-
fishing-pirate-trawlers. 
 3 Sharon LaFraniere, Europe Takes Africa’s Fish, and Boatloads of Migrants Follow, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2008, at A1 (describing the African fisheries crisis and noting that 
“[o]verfishing is hardly limited to African waters”). 
 4 MARIANO IOSSA ET AL., SELFISH EUROPE: HOW THE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP 
AGREEMENTS WOULD FURTHER CONTRIBUTE TO THE DECLINE OF FISH STOCKS AND 
EXACERBATE THE FOOD CRISIS IN SENEGAL 14 (2008), available at http://www.actionaid.org/ 
sites/files/actionaid/selfish_europe.pdf (noting that the European Union can only supply 50% 
of its current internal demand for fish from its own waters). 
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resources that are in the waters of other States without the host coastal 
State’s citizens receiving any direct benefits.5   
Illegal fishing in the West African region is a matter of fundamental 
human rights.  Across the globe, oceanic artisanal fishing plays an essential 
role in promoting food security, with artisanal fishers catching about 30 
million tons of fish.6  The fish caught by these artisanal fishers are the 
primary source of protein in many communities, particularly those in 
developing countries.  Unfortunately, the artisanal fishing communities in 
some places are in direct competition with industrial fishing operations.  
Those operators collectively catch approximately 30 million tons of fish for 
food and 35 million tons of marine biomass for fish oil and fish meal, while 
discarding 15 million tons of by-catch.7  This clash between artisanal fishing 
and industrial operations is particularly evident in West Africa.  
But all is not well with the health of West African coastal fisheries either.  
This is not merely a tale of exploitation by foreign fleets.  Overfishing 
practices by industrial fleets have exacerbated overfishing by coastal 
fishermen, leading to dwindling catches.  The story of the Senegalese 
fisherman Niadye Diouf is representative of this disheartening trend.  He said 
that in 2008 it would take five times as many local boats to catch what was 
one available in a single local boat.8  Local fishermen are unable to 
sustainably manage formerly productive fisheries because of the current 
conditions of the coastal fishery stocks in West African waters.  In response 
to this looming crisis of scarce resources, one civil society group working in 
the area has called for “a permanent suspension of the [foreign] fisheries 
agreements, the imposition of biological rest periods and reinforced 
surveillance of territorial waters.”9 
This Article will focus on the recurring food security challenges facing 
West African States whose waters are being regularly exploited by distant 
water fishing vessels in ongoing, legalized ocean-grabs.  Part II examines the 
conditions of West African fisheries that have led to a state of scarcity, 
                                                                                                                   
 5 Anastasia Telesetsky, Resource Conflicts over Arable Land in Food Insecure States: 
Creating an United Nations Ombudsman Institution to Review Foreign Agricultural Land 
Leases, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 283, 315 (Ger.) (concluding that foreign leases of 
“agricultural land in food insecure countries is an emerging case of elite resource capture that 
threatens human security”). 
 6 Christopher Pala, Billions in Subsidies Prop Up Unsustainable Overfishing, INTER PRESS 
SERVICE (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/11/billions-in-subsidies-prop-up-unsus 
tainable-overfishing/.  
 7 Id. 
 8 LaFraniere, supra note 3. 
 9 IOSSA ET AL., supra note 4, at 15. 
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including the active and legalized presence of foreign fishing fleets and the 
under-enforcement of domestic laws designed to manage both foreign and 
artisanal fishers.  This section addresses two encouraging regional legal 
developments that could alleviate pressures on fishery resources.  Part III 
explores the tension between States’ obligations under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which requires them to allow other States 
to exploit marine resource surpluses, and the competing obligation to satisfy 
their populations’ human right-to-food.  Part IV suggests that governments 
must re-engage fishery problems at different scales.  It proposes several 
government policy options that prioritize restoration of fishery resources for 
artisanal fishing communities, including new financing for enforcement and 
the creation of new frameworks of user rights for coastal fisheries. 
 II.  WEST AFRICAN FISHERIES AND THE CREATION OF CONDITIONS OF 
MARINE RESOURCE SCARCITY 
West African fisheries are among the most threatened fisheries in the 
world because they have become both the overused “safety net” for local 
food security and a target of the global pursuit for economically valuable 
commodities.10  In coastal Africa, fish represent one of the most important 
sources of dietary protein.  In fact, in some African countries such as the 
Congo, Cte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Ghana, the population obtains almost half 
of its animal protein from fish.11  But it is not fishers from West African 
coastal States alone who are capturing fish within West African waters.   In 
the past couple of decades, distant water fishing fleets have created 
conditions of physical scarcity for local coastal fishing communities.  
A.  Distant Water Fishing Vessels and Marine Resource Exploitation 
Having overfished European waters to the point where stocks are no 
longer healthy, the European Union through the European Commission has 
been negotiating special access agreements with a number of Western 
African States for European flagged vessels to supply fish valued at $1.75 
                                                                                                                   
 10 Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Interim Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food, U.N. DOC. A/67/268 (Aug. 8, 2012) (by Oliver De Schutter) (“[Fishing] plays 
an important safety net function, however.  In times of crisis, often caused by failing 
agriculture, conflict or recession, fishing provides important part-time or temporary income or 
relatively free food.”). 
 11 Achieving Poverty Reduction Through Responsible Fisheries: Lessons from West and 
Central Africa, FAO FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE TECHNICAL PAPER 513, at 48 (1980). 
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billion to the European market.12  The earliest versions of these partnerships 
provided fish to European actors at greatly reduced prices with only minimal 
benefit flowing to the West African States and almost no benefit trickling 
down to the artisanal fishing communities.  The access rights that Europe 
purchased were an example of a “bad subsidy” that allowed for excess 
fishing capacity to be transferred from the North to developing countries’ 
waters.  The European Union continues to provide payments of 
approximately 400 million dollars to African States to benefit fleets 
primarily from Spain, France, and Portugal.13  Countries such as Mauritania, 
which depend on these payments from the European Commission, continue 
to grant fishing rights to foreign vessels in spite of reduced fish stocks.14  
Particularly problematic is the parallel nature of a number of these 
agreements.  For example, the European Union in the early 1980s entered 
into agreements with Senegal, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau.15  Located in 
close proximity to each other, these countries share a number of fish stocks, 
but each independently sets its own total allowable number of catches for its 
EEZ.  In competition with one another for economic advantage, each State 
independently offered generous allocations of the shared stock such that their 
cumulative allocations exceeded an ecologically appropriate catch limit.   
Other countries such as China also deploy distant water fishing vessels in 
West African waters under private joint venture agreements as part of a 
transnational economic network.16  These agreements are frequently signed 
by private fishing companies with national governments.17  China has 
                                                                                                                   
 12 THOMAS BINET, FISHING FOR COHERENCE IN WEST AFRICA: POLICY COHERENCE IN THE 
FISHERIES SECTOR IN SEVEN WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES 13 (2008).  
 13 U. Rashid Sumaila et al., A Bottom-Up Re-Estimation of Global Fisheries Subsidies, 12 
J. BIOECONOMICS 201, 211 (2010) (“Spain has been particularly successful with the EU 
assistance subsidies for joint ventures, with over 250 vessels in 22 countries and catching up 
to reaching 190,000 tonnes.”). 
 14 LaFraniere, supra note 3.  
 15 Council Regulation 971/83, Agreement Between the European Economic Community 
and the Government of the Revolutionary People’s Republic of Guinea on Fishing off the 
Guinean Coast, 1983 O.J. (L111) 2; Council Regulation 2213/80, Agreement Between the 
Government of the Republic of Guinea Bissau, 1980 O.J. (L226) 34; Council Regulation 
2212/80, Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the European 
Economic Community on fishing off the coast of Senegal, 1980 O.J. (L226) 17. 
 16 Ahmed Khan, U. Rashid Sumaila, Reg Watson, Gordon Munro & Daniel Pauly, The 
Nature and Magnitude of Global Non-Fuel Fisheries Subsidies, in CATCHING MORE BAIT: A 
BOTTOM-UP RE-ESTIMATION OF GLOBAL FISHERIES SUBSIDIES 5, 23–24 (U. Rashid Sumaila & 
D. Pauly eds., 2006).  
 17 Antonius Gagern & Jeroen van den Bergh, A Critical Review of Fishing Agreements with 
Tropical Developing Countries, 38 MARINE POL’Y 375, 378 (2013) (explaining that 
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bilateral fisheries access agreements with a number of West African States 
including Guinea-Bissau (1984), Guinea (1985), Senegal (1985), and Sierra 
Leone (1985), providing Chinese vessels broad access to West African 
coastal waters.18  In 2011, in spite of declines in global fisheries, the Chinese 
Agriculture Ministry observed that the catch attributed to Chinese fishing 
fleets in West Africa rose 14% in volume and 41% in value.19 
The foreign access agreements have resulted in what might be 
characterized as a legalized form of ocean-grabbing.  Industrial fishing 
vessels operating under various bilateral agreements and contracts with the 
coastal States in prime fisheries such as the Guinea Current have been 
encroaching on artisanal fishing grounds communities leading to ongoing 
conflicts.20  As industrial trawling activity increases, the artisanal fish harvest 
is decreasing for coastal populations.21  While the European Union continues 
to negotiate agreements with West African States with the justification that 
the EU is contributing to positive conditions for human development by 
offering funds for fishing infrastructure, fishing rights for foreign vessels 
continue to be sold at less than the value of the resource, and little value-
added fish processing is actually taking place in Western Africa.22  
In addition to the licensed foreign vessels fishing under foreign fishing 
access agreements or joint venture operations, rampant illegal activity also 
occurs within the West African coastal waters, spurred in part by the coastal 
States’ lack of political will and enforcement capacity.  Of the seventy 
foreign trawlers that were flying a Chinese flag within Sierra Leone’s waters 
in 2005, a number of the Chinese vessels are suspected of IUU fishing.23    
                                                                                                                   
agreements between private industry and West African governments are common for South 
Korean, Taiwanese, and Chinese fleets). 
 18 Tabitha Mallory, China’s Distant Water Fishing Industry: Evolving Policies and 
Implications, 38 MARINE POL’Y 103 (2013) 
 19 Chuin-Wei Yap & Sameer Mohindru, China’s Hunger for Fish Upsets Seas: Reach of 
Massive Fleet Cuts Into Stock, Tests Ties on Opposite Side of the World, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 
2012, at A7. 
 20 GUINEA CURRENT LARGE MARINE ECOSYSTEM, TRANSBOUNDARY DIAGNOSTIC ANALYSIS 
39 (Feb. 2006). 
 21 K.A. Koranteng, Status of Demersal Fishery Resources on the Inner Continental Shelf off 
Ghana, in THE GULF OF GUINEA LARGE MARINE ECOSYSTEM: ENVIRONMENTAL FORCING AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF MARINE RESOURCES 261, 273 (J.M. McGlade et al. eds., 
2002). 
 22 Gagern & van den Bergh, supra note 17, at 378 (“Funds do not reach the intended 
purposes, fish stocks are decreasing and the lives of fish workers in contacting states are 
harder than ever.” (quoting SWEDISH SOCIETY FOR NATURE CONSERVATION, TO DRAW THE 
LINE: EU FISHERIES AGREEMENTS IN WEST AFRICA 60 (2009))). 
 23 Mallory, supra note 18, at 103 (“In 2005, there were approximately 70 foreign trawlers 
and sardine purse seiners in Sierra Leone’s waters.”); EQUAL JUSTICE FOUNDATION, PIRATE 
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B.  Responsiveness of Domestic Law  
Well-written laws alone have failed to create sufficient incentives to 
conserve marine resources.  As this Article will describe, the law itself as 
written, while not optimal in all regards, has sufficient conservation and 
enforcement language to provide protection of marine resources.  This 
Article examines three fishery codes within West Africa to determine what 
enforcement options are available under the law and whether additional legal 
reforms may be needed to strengthen the deterrence component of the law, or 
whether resources and attention should be focused on enforcement of pre-
existing laws. The first and second codes, from Gambia and Liberia 
respectively, have been revised recently and incorporate best management 
practices into the revised texts.  The third case, the code and regulations of 
Sierra Leone that date from the mid-1990s, reflects a transitional code that 
might be revised, particularly in relation to the relatively low penalties for 
violations.  Ultimately, though, it is clear that good law does not translate 
into sufficient enforcement.  
1.  Gambia 
The fishing industry is clearly an important economic sector in Gambia: it 
is the third largest production sector in Gambia and it accounts for 12% of 
the country’s GDP.24  Concerned that the 1991 code was not addressing the 
relationship between national fisheries and poverty reduction, Gambia 
revised its fisheries laws in 1997 to better address resource demands by both 
local and foreign fishing vessels.25  Fishery management decisions appear to 
be concentrated largely in the hands of one decision-maker, raising 
accountability concerns particularly in relation to allocations for foreign 
fleets.26  The Secretary of State is empowered to decide the total allowable 
catch (TAC), or total allowable level of fishing effort, for each fish stock as 
well as the allocations associated with either the TAC or fishing effort 
level.27  The same individual may also enter into bilateral or multilateral 
access agreements with other States or associations representing foreign 
                                                                                                                   
FISHING EXPOSED: THE FIGHT AGAINST ILLEGAL FISHING IN WEST AFRICA AND THE EU 7 
(2012). 
 24 Food and Agriculture Organization, Information on Fisheries Management in the 
Republic of Gambia (2001), http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/FCP/en/GMB/body.thm. 
 25 Fisheries Act (2007) 20 O.G. (Supp. C) (Gambia). 
 26 Id. §§ 11–12. 
 27 Id. 
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fishing vessel owners to provide an allocation of fishing rights.28  This same 
individual may also designate enforcement officers who are not Gambian but 
are authorized to enforce the Gambian Fisheries Act.29  The revised act also 
provides the Secretary of State with the power to require vessel monitoring 
systems on boats operating in Gambian waters.30  There are no apparent 
statutory checks or balances on the Secretary’s powers under the Fisheries 
Act.31  
In addition, the Secretary may designate a special management area to 
zone for “community based fisheries management” as well as to support 
“artisanal or subsistence fishing operations.”32  In principle, this is a positive 
development focused on meeting the needs of coastal communities. What 
groups are addressed in this management measure has the potential to be 
ambiguous.  The term “community based fisheries management” is 
unfortunately undefined in the act.33  “[A]rtisanal fishing” is simply 
described as fishing, including commercial fishing, with “motorized or non-
motorized canoes,” and the term “canoe” is undefined.34 “Local fishing 
vessel” is defined in the code to require a genuine link between Gambia, the 
owner of the vessel, and the profits of the fishing activity.35  There is no 
indication in the law as to whether artisanal fishing includes only local 
fishermen using their canoes to fish for local markets or whether it also 
includes regional fishermen who are hired by foreign vessels to fish in the 
special areas and supply the fish to the foreign fleets.36 
The Gambian code requires licensing for both local and foreign fishing 
vessels.37  A failure to comply with the code results in a fine between five 
and thirty-five million dalasis ($152,000–$760,000), a prison term between 
five and ten years, or some combination of the two.38  In addition to these 
penalties, the court may order forfeiture of the vessel used to commit an 
offense and any fish caught illegally.39  The Gambian Director of Fisheries 
can refuse entry to foreign vessels that are believed to be in violation of 
                                                                                                                   
 28 Id. § 38(1).  
 29 Id. § 2 (referring to fisheries officers, police officers, Gambian Navy officers, and 
customs officers); id. § 70(1). 
 30 Id. § 106(2)(q). 
 31 See id. 
 32 Id. § 14(1). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. § 2.  
 35 Id. 
 36 See id. 
 37 Id. §§ 35–37 (local licensing provisions); id. §§ 38–42 (foreign licensing provisions). 
 38 Id. § 39(9) 
 39 Id. § 84(1). 
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international conservation and management measures.40  Under the Fisheries 
Act, the authorized fishery officers have the power to seize boats that are in 
Gambian waters in violation of international conservation and management 
measures.41  The director may require onboard fishing observers for certain 
fisheries that are subject to a foreign access agreement.42  Fines and prison 
sentences are levied and assigned for the illegal use of industrial driftnets, 
leaving non-biodegradable items in fishery waters, fishing with explosives or 
poisons, dumping fish processing waste, and willfully damaging or 
destroying fishing vessels or gear.43  
2.  Liberia 
Liberia’s population is also heavily dependent on fish, with artisanal 
fishers competing both directly and indirectly with a $12 million illegal 
fishing industry that is spearheaded by distant water industrial fishing 
vessels.44  In 2010, the Liberian government promulgated a new set of 
regulations to protect its fishery resources.45  Like in the Gambian code, the 
Liberian code defines “artisanal fishing,” as “small scale commercial 
fishing” using motorized or non-motorized fishing vessels or canoes that are 
sixty feet or shorter.46  It is unclear whether foreign industrial vessels can 
contract with artisanal fishers to support their export-oriented activities.47  
Artisanal fishers are expected to have licenses in order to fish within the 
inshore exclusion zone.48 
Unlike Gambia, Liberia does not require evidence of an access agreement 
in order to issue licenses for foreign fishing vessels.  It does require the 
posting of a performance bond “as a financial guarantee for the fulfillment of 
all obligations arising out of the license . . . including potential costs relating 
to rescue, other cost recovery and fines, penalties or compensation for 
                                                                                                                   
 40 Id. § 41(2)(a).  
 41 Id. § 73(2). 
 42 Id. § 79(2). 
 43 Id. §§ 62, 64–67. 
 44 WORLD BANK, PREVENTION FIRST: THE WORLD BANK’S APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
CRIME (Aug. 30, 2012), available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPIC 
S/ENVIRONMENT/EXTBIODIVERSITY/0,,contentMDK:23264957~pagePK:210058~piPK
:210062~theSitePK:400953,00.html. 
 45 MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, REGULATIONS RELATING TO FISHERIES, FISHING AND 
RELATED ACTIVITIES FOR THE MARINE FISHERIES SECTOR IN THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA (2010), 
available at http://liberiafisheries.net/sites/default/files/pdf/fisheries_reg-final.pdf.  
 46 Id. § 1. 
 47 See id. 
 48 Id. §§ 6, 14(1)(c). 
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violations against these Regulations.”49  Liberia has a number of reporting 
laws that apply to “any ‘industrial fishing vessel[ ]’ ” which is defined 
broadly as “decked fishing vessel with an internal engine with a capacity 
greater than 100bhp that is greater than ninety feet in length.”50  Liberian law 
is unclear as to whether the references to “industrial fishing vessels” are only 
to Liberian flagged vessels or whether it also refers to foreign flagged 
industrial vessels.  Reading the code as a whole, it appears to suggest that the 
regulations impose only limited requirements on foreign flagged industrial 
vessels.51  
Liberian fishing inspectors have the power to seize vessels that may have 
been engaged in illegal fishing as well as any illegally obtained cargo.52  The 
inspectors are empowered to use warning shots or devices to impede the 
propulsion of the vessel.53  Observers may be appointed to report on 
scientific monitory, and compliance of vessels with marine conservation 
laws.54  The Coordinator has the discretion as to whether to require observers 
to be deployed onboard ships, as well as whether a fishing vessel operator 
must participate in a vessel monitoring system.55  Penalties range from 
$10,000 for a failure to declare quantity of fish onboard to $1,000,000 for 
fishing without a license.56  Criminal sanctions are also possible, but 
imprisonment is not a possibility for foreign crew in conformity with Article 
73(3) of the Law of the Sea.57   
3.  Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone’s Fisheries Decree and Regulations date from 1994.58  As 
with the Gambian and Liberian laws, Sierra Leone recognizes the delicate 
                                                                                                                   
 49 Id. § 17. 
 50 Id. § 1. 
 51 Id. §§ 37–39 (requiring foreign vessels to provide information before arriving in port to 
be used to determine whether IUU fishing has occurred and submit to possible inspections). 
 52 Id. at 47(2). 
 53 Id. § 47(3).  
 54 Id. § 48(1). 
 55 Id. §§ 49, 55.  
 56 Id. § 58.  
 57 Id. §§ 58(8), 59; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 73(3), Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (providing that “[c]oastal state penalties for violations of fisheries 
laws and regulations in the exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the 
absence of agreements to the contrary by the States concerned, or any other form of corporal 
punishment”).  
 58 The Fisheries (Management and Development) Decree, 1994 (Supplement to the Sierra 
Leone Gazette, Vol. CXXV dated 8th December 1994) [hereinafter Sierra Leone Fisheries 
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position of artisanal fishing communities.59  The artisanal fishing vessels are 
required to carry registration but not to have a license for fishing.60  Local 
fishing vessels, defined as any vessel either fully or more than 50% owned or 
capitalized by Sierra Leoneans, are required to have licenses.61  All foreign 
fishing vessels must operate with a valid license based on an access 
agreement negotiated between Sierra Leone and foreign governments.62  
The Director of Fisheries has monitoring, control, surveillance, and 
enforcement capabilities, including the power to board and inspect vessels.63  
The fines and penalties collected for violations of the fishery laws help fund 
this work.64  A captain’s failure to provide information on export statistics 
can result in either a fine of ten million leones (approximately $2,313) or an 
imprisonment term of two years.65  Violations of fishery regulations result in 
$5,000 fines for foreign vessels or foreign citizens and $1,000 fines for local 
fishing vessels or Sierra Leone’s citizens.66 
4.  Reflections on the Effectiveness of the Domestic Fishery Codes as Law 
in Protecting Scarce Resources 
Overall, the codes seem to moderately protect the marine resources within 
the EEZ by requiring state-issued licenses for foreign fishing vessels, 
imposing penalties for failures to comply with the codes, and creating a 
system for monitoring.  Some additional refinements of these codes may be 
possible in terms of designating who is an artisanal fisher, rather than an 
industrial commercial fisher, in order to extend greater protection from the 
State to artisanal fishing communities.  All of the codes might be revised to 
rescind artisanal fishing protection for fishermen engaged in fishing activities 
on behalf of foreign or national industrial fishing companies.  Sierra Leone 
should consider adding provisions to require artisanal fishing vessels to carry 
some form of fishing licenses to ensure that artisanal fishing protects marine 
resources.   
                                                                                                                   
Decree]; The Fisheries (Management and Development) Decree 1994, The Fisheries 
Regulations 1995 [hereinafter Sierra Leone Fisheries Regulations]. 
 59 Sierra Leone Fisheries Regulations, Part II(3). 
 60 Id. § (4)(1). 
 61 Sierra Leone Fisheries Decree, supra note 58, §§ 15–20, 105.  
 62 Id. § 22.  
 63 Id. § 63. 
 64 Id. § 61. 
 65 Id. § 100(4). 
 66 Sierra Leone Fisheries Regulation, supra note 58, § 42. 
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5.  Enforcement: The Missing Ingredient? 
The problem for West Africa is not the content of its written laws.  
Policymakers have recognized the crisis of the modern fisheries and have 
done something conceptually to address it by separating artisanal fishing 
concerns from the foreign fishing industry.  Practically, the crisis for West 
African State fisheries is one of repetitive under-enforcement of existing 
laws.  While punitive laws exist for all of the States reviewed, these codes 
remain under-enforced due to a lack of enforcement resource capacity, a lack 
of political will, or just plain corruption.67  Based on a review of international 
newspapers in legal databases, few enforcement actions are being reported 
by any of the West African coastal States.68  Flag States do not appear to be 
pursuing robust monitoring efforts of their vessels, resulting in coastal States 
being defrauded.69  The Senegalese Minister of Fisheries and Maritime 
Affairs explained that even though he has information about vessels illegally 
fishing, his department lacks the resources to react.70  Only States such as 
South Africa and Namibia have the resources to maintain a consistent 
enforcement program.71  In spite of valiant efforts by some States to seek 
prosecutions of illegal fishing, the regional response to resource degradation 
has traditionally been poorly coordinated.72  This may be slowly changing, 
with some of the States appearing poised to reverse the current trends.  
C.  Promising Developments in West Africa to Address the Conditions of 
Marine Resource Scarcity 
There is reason for hope.  Many of the most affected States in West 
Africa are no longer in denial that there is a resource crisis.  States, such as 
Senegal, that formerly gave distant water fishing vessels access to their 
                                                                                                                   
 67 LaFraniere, supra note 3 (describing a situation in Guinea Bissau where in 2005 there 
were no patrol boats, twelve fishing ministers in eight years, government observers were 
easily paid off, and where in 2008 the EU was given the right to fish for shrimp, tuna, and 
octopus in already depleted waters). 
 68 The terms searched for were “West Africa” or individual West African state names and 
“fishery enforcement.” 
 69 RamsNeil Ramsden, Starkist Parent Dongwon Accused of IUU Fishing, Fraud, 
UNDERCURRENT NEWS (Mar. 12, 2013), available at http://www.undercurrentnews.com/2013/ 
03/12/starkist-parent-dongwon-accused-of-iuu-fishing-fraud/#.UUYr93FbyJU. 
 70 West Africa Aims to Stop Illegal Fishing, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 8, 2013.  
 71 Mary Kimani, Safeguarding Africa’s Fishing Waters, Regional Action Needed to Stop 
Illegal Trawlers, AFRICA RENEWAL (July 2009), available at http://www.un.org/africarenewal/ 
magazine/july-2009/safeguarding-africa%E2%80%99s-fishing-waters.  
 72 EQUAL JUSTICE FOUNDATION, supra note 23, at 19–24.  
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waters are now retracting licenses and raising the international alarm about 
the condition of their fisheries.73  In 2012, Senegal rescinded twenty-nine 
fishing licenses for foreign trawlers and demanded that these vessels offload 
their catches before leaving Senegalese waters.74  This response was the 
product of great frustration by the Senegalese ministries whose waters were 
essentially being colonized by foreign vessels.  In 2006, even though Senegal 
had terminated its fishery access agreements with the EU, Senegal’s waters 
continued to be fished by vessels from Russia, Lithuania, Morocco, Ukraine, 
and other flags of convenience States whose vessels continued their 
destructive fishing practices.75    
In order to provide a clear declaration of what the rights and obligations 
of States within West African waters are, the Sub-Regional Fisheries 
Commission composed of Cape Verde, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mauritania, Senegal, and Sierra Leone has requested an advisory opinion 
from the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea.76  ITLOS has taken the 
request under advisement and entered the request as Case No. 21.77  
In spite of these hopeful developments, there remain inherent legal 
tensions within West African States between meeting basic needs of citizens 
through ensuring access to food resources and meeting basic needs of 
citizens through national development schemes, including the bilateral 
Fishery Partnership Agreements and the joint development projects 
supported by foreign investment.  The following section looks specifically at 
the collision between the State’s obligation to protect the human right to food 
                                                                                                                   
 73 John Vidal, Senegal Revokes Licences of Foreign Fishing Trawlers, GUARDIAN (May 4, 
2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/may/04/senegal-revokes-licences-foreign-f 
ishing-vessels. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id.; Flags of Convenience, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/flag_of_convenience (last visited Oct. 8, 2013) (defining flag of convenience as 
“registry of a merchant ship under a foreign flag in order to profit from less restrictive 
regulations”).  
 76 Press Release, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, The International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea Receives a Request for an Advisory Opinion from the Sub-Regional 
Fisheries Commission (Mar. 28, 2013) (noting that the request has been made pursuant to the 
2012 Convention on the Determination of the Minimal Conditions for Access and 
Exploitation of Marine Resources within the Maritime Areas under Jurisdiction of the 
Member States of the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, which is an initial effort by the 
parties to harmonize fishing standards for a common fishing policy). 
 77 Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, 
Order 2013/2 of May 24, 2013, available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/ 
cases/case_no.21/C21_ord_2013-2_24.05_E.pdf (noting that the case has been docketed as 
case number 21). 
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and the State’s obligation to allow other States access to EEZ waters for 
optimal utilizations of marine resources.  
III.  THE RIGHT TO FOOD AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE LAW OF THE SEA: 
COMPETING STATE OBLIGATIONS  
The right to food is a fundamental human right articulated in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  It provides 
that everyone has the right to “adequate food . . . and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions.”78  As the UN understands the right, it is 
“inseparable from social justice, requiring the adoption of appropriate 
economic, environmental and social policies, at both the national and 
international levels, oriented to the eradication of poverty and the fulfillment 
of all human rights for all.”79  In 2012, the Special Rapporteur on the Right 
to Food explored the relationship between the right to food and fishing and 
concluded that current fishing practices may jeopardize a State’s ability to 
ensure adequate food for its population.80  He called for States to assess 
whether their policies are interfering with “existing access to adequate food” 
and to ensure that “enterprises or individuals do not deprive individuals of 
their access to adequate food.”81  He specifically called for States to “search 
for arrangements that preserve the long-term (environmental) sustainability 
of fishing, including . . . reducing overfishing and conserving fish habitats, 
while concurrently improving the incomes of small-scale fishing 
communities . . . .”82 
The West African fisheries present a curious case when examined 
simultaneously through the lens of the right to food and the Law of the Sea’s 
Article 62.  The West African coastal States that depend on fish resources 
have a clear legal right to fish in their waters in order to meet their citizens’ 
rights to food.  But there may be a legal question as to the temporal nature of 
the right to food.  Do States have a right to withhold foreign access to food 
resources under their jurisdiction when they would otherwise have a 
quantitative surplus where the total allowable catch is set at the maximum 
sustainable yield based on assumptions about industrial fishing practices?  
                                                                                                                   
 78 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 11(1), Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 79 General Comment No. 12: Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, CESCR, 20th Sess., Apr. 
26–May 14, 1999, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999). 
 80 Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, supra note 10. 
 81 Id. ¶¶ 39–40. 
 82 Id. ¶ 41. 
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On the one hand, it appears that developing states may have the ability to 
protect future generations since the Law of the Sea allows for States to 
control access depending on “the significance of the living resources of the 
area to the economy of the coastal State concerned and its other national 
interests.”83  West African States can argue for an exclusive right to fisheries 
in their EEZ because of strong national interests in creating a foundation for 
current and future food security.  For many of the coastal States with large 
and growing populations along the coast, maintaining a healthy population of 
fish and seafood for harvesting is a key aspect of avoiding shocks of famine 
and the unpredictable impacts of climate change.  Adapting to climate 
change may require a shift from relying heavily on agricultural products for 
nutrition to relying more on fish products84—especially given predictions 
that climate change may reduce per-capita calorie availability in West Africa, 
where a large proportion of the population is already calorie deficient.85  
In contrast to Article 62(3), which accords coastal States some discretion 
on how they will provide access to living resources in their EEZ, Article 
62(2) of the Law of the Sea suggests that coastal States lacking capacity “to 
harvest the entire allowable catch” have an affirmative obligation “through 
agreements or other arrangements” to “give other States access to the surplus 
of the allowable catch.”86  This obligation is conditioned since coastal States 
who may not have the capacity to “harvest the entire allowable catch” in 
their EEZ should also take into consideration “the need to minimize 
economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the 
zone or which have made substantial efforts in research and identification of 
stocks.”87  Applying this factor, a West African State might continue to allow 
distant water fishing vessels to fish within its waters because these vessels 
have been fishing in the West African waters since before many of these 
West African States ratified the Law of the Sea Convention.88  The question 
                                                                                                                   
 83 Law of the Sea, supra note 57, art. 62(3). 
 84 U.N. G.A. Background Paper, Climate Change and the Most Vulnerable Countries: The 
Imperative To Act (July 8, 2008), http://www.un.org/ga/president/62/ThematicDebates/ccact/ 
vulnbackgrounder1July.pdf (reporting that rain-fed agriculture may reduce yields by up to 
50% in some African States by 2020). 
 85 Undernourishment Around the World: Depth of Hunger: How Hungry are the Hungry?, 
FAO.ORG, http://www.fao.org/docrep/x8200e/x8200e03.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). 
 86 Law of the Sea, supra note 57, art. 62(2). 
 87 Id. art. 62(3). 
 88 See Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention 
and the Related Agreements as of September 20 2013, http://www.un.org/depts./los/reference_fi 
les/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#The%20United%20Nations%20Convetnion%20on
%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea (listing ratification dates for Liberia (2008), Sierra Leone 
(1994), Mauritania (1996), Guinea-Bissau (1986), Guinea (1985), and Senegal (1984)). 
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of whether this is a reasonable reading depends on what the drafters of the 
Law of the Sea meant by “habitually fished”—some of the distant water 
fishing industrial trawlers have been operating for at least a decade in 
African waters.89   
It seems counterintuitive that in a time of scarcity, countries that have 
maintained their food resources through reduced fishing efforts and who now 
have a surplus in terms of total allowable catch may have an obligation to 
share this surplus with States that have historically overexploited their 
waters.  Article 62(2), with its affirmative language requiring that coastal 
States without harvest capacity “shall . . . give other States access to the 
surplus” seems to suggest support for the continuation of the EU fishing 
program in Africa.90  As tides turn and natural capital becomes valued not 
just for its consumptive use but also for its contribution to ecosystem 
services, countries hosting some of the world’s last great fish stocks and still 
healthy biodiversity are understandably reluctant to continue opening their 
waters to foreign vessels even if they have permitted industrial fishing in the 
past.91  What arises is a collision between States’ obligations to ensure the 
progressive realization of the right to food and States’ obligations under the 
Law of the Sea to provide access to marine “surplus” below the quantified 
level of total allowable catches.92  The scarcity of marine fishery resources 
creates a race to fish by industrial fleets and artisanal fishermen, both of 
whom see their livelihoods disappearing.93   
IV.  LONG-TERM POLICIES TO PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE RIGHT TO FOOD 
IN WEST AFRICA 
In order to shape an appropriate policy response to the overexploitation of 
West African fisheries, greater focus needs to be placed on the institutions 
that are socially engaged in both promoting fishing and protecting fisheries 
and the conflict between the set of rules provided by such institutions.  Nobel 
                                                                                                                   
 89 See generally Agreement Between the European Economic Community and the Islamic 
Republic of Mauritania on Fishing off the Coast of Mauritania: Protocol Setting Out Fishing 
Opportunities and Financial Compensation for the Period 1 July 1987 to 30 June 1990, Eur.-
Mauritania, Oct. 24, 1987, Official Journal L. 302 24.10.1987, pp. 26–35. 
 90 Law of the Sea, supra note 57, art. 62(2). 
 91 The Future of Fish: The Fisheries of the Future, 2 WORLD OCEAN REV. 116 (2013), 
available at http://worldoceanreview.com/wp-content/downloads/wor2/WOR2_english.pdf. 
 92 See Law of the Sea, supra note 57 (failing to define the term “surplus”).  
 93 SLIDESHOW: Illegal Fishing Hits Fish Stocks, Livelihoods in Sierra Leone, IRIN (Dec. 
6, 2012), http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96980/slideshow-illegal-fishing-%20hits-fish-stock 
s-livelihoods-in-sierra-leone. 
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Prize winner Elinor Ostrom has proposed and theorized a conceptual 
framework called “institutional analysis and development” to explain how 
social institutions can change the incentives of how individuals and groups 
act.94  One area of particular interest for Professor Ostrom and her 
collaborators has been the identification of variables that impact institutions.  
One such “exogenous variable” with bearing on the case study of West 
African fisheries is the “concept of rules.”95  Drawing on work by political 
scientist Max Black, Ostrom identifies four types of possible rules: binding 
regulations; instructions (e.g., formulas); moral precepts; and physical laws 
or principles.96  All of these types of rules contribute to creating “shared 
understandings” regarding what is “required, prohibited, or permitted.”97  
What becomes apparent in reflecting on the current situation in the West 
African fisheries is that there is no uniform set of rules that applies to all of 
the fishery actors.  Fisheries scientists weighing in on the physical laws 
suggest that the fisheries are overexploited.  Meanwhile, West African 
nations are creating binding regulations with European partners that fail to 
address the fact that most of the West African countries lack the diplomatic 
leverage to persuade the States whose nationals or vessels are over-fishing to 
cease and desist from both environmentally and socially damaging fishery 
practices.  The distant water fishing vessels comply with rules as practical 
economic instructions with the primary rule seeming to be: “A vessel may 
fish within a region until there are low yields in the net and then the vessel 
should move on to the next fishery.”  By contrast, the coastal artisanal fishers 
living in communities of fisherfolk have complex moral precepts and 
principles that guide their actions, including cultural mores and norms.   
With conflicting sets of rules in practice for the major actors in the West 
African fisheries—the industrial trawlers, the coastal artisanal fishers, the 
distant water fishing nations, the flags of convenience nations that register 
some of the trawlers, and the coastal States—it is unsurprising that there are 
tensions among the actors.  By acknowledging that players consider 
themselves to be playing by different sets of rules and not simply by the laws 
of the coastal States, the international Law of the Sea, or human rights laws 
like the right to food, it becomes possible to identify strategies that may 
encourage longer-term intervention at a scale most likely to result in 
appropriate responses to growing conditions of scarcity.   
                                                                                                                   
 94 ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 6 (2005). 
 95 Id. at 16–17. 
 96 Id. (citing Max Black, The Analysis of Rules, in MODELS AND METAPHORS: STUDIES IN 
LANGUAGE AND LOGIC (Max Black ed., 1962)). 
 97 Id. at 18. 
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The West African fisheries problem is a multi-scale problem.  It is largely 
an international problem caused by historically inadequate fishery 
conservation efforts in developed States in Europe, aggressive food security 
strategies in developing States in Asia, and revenue generation for countries 
choosing to flag any vessel that will pay the registration fees.  It is also a 
regional problem, with a lack of coordination among West African States to 
eliminate destructive fishing practices.  Finally, the fisheries problems are a 
local problem, with local fishing communities unsustainably competing for 
scarce resources.  What is needed is a multi-scale approach to fisheries 
governance.  Rather than the current efforts to pursue reforms that fail to 
address the complexities of managing national fisheries for both a global 
market and for local consumption, reforms need to be initiated across the 
supply and demand chain with a focus on the most vulnerable populations 
that cannot substitute other sources of protein.  The World Bank has called 
for a policy response at multiple levels, observing at its conference “The 
Hidden Harvests” that “[c]ontrol of industrial fleets in coastal areas 
combined with responsible practices by small-scale fishing communities can 
recover these economic rents [global economic losses of $50 billion 
annually] and maintain the integrity of fishery dependent communities.”98  
Given the gravity of the situation in West Africa, where the seas are being 
literally plundered, there have been multiple calls for action by civil society 
groups and most recently by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Food.99  The remainder of this section provides three policy proposals for 
coastal States to immediately address the ongoing tensions that have 
emerged surrounding the ocean-grabbing practices of some foreign fleets and 
unsustainable coastal fishery practices.  These proposals are offered as 
possible “rules” to “create shared understandings” regarding what is 
“required, prohibited, or permitted” in order to ensure a reasonably stable 
future for the West African EEZ fisheries.100  
                                                                                                                   
 98 WORLD BANK, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION & WORLDFISH CENTER, THE 
HIDDEN HARVESTS: CONFERENCE EDITION 51 (June 2010). 
 99 Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, supra note 7. 
 100 OSTROM, supra note 94, at 18.  
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V.  POLICY PROPOSALS 
A.  West African States Should Temporarily Close Their EEZ to Foreign and 
Domestic Industrial Operations until Effective Compliance and Enforcement 
Eliminates Illegal Fishing Operations 
Even though a moratorium on industrial fishing alone will not solve the 
problems caused by over-fishing, a moratorium is still essential for two 
reasons.  First, it will permit threatened stocks to rebound by reducing 
fishing effort and allowing for West African States to meet their obligations 
under the Law of the Sea to “ensure through proper conservation and 
management measures that the maintenance of the living resources in the 
[EEZ] is not endangered by over-exploitation.”101  Second, it will allow 
governments to assess what the overall status is of their marine resources, 
including both single stocks and shared stocks.  Currently, there is a lack of 
scientific data about many of the species in the West African waters because 
the States do not have the internal resources to invest in marine scientific 
research.  
Some coastal regions of the world are in the process of imposing 
moratoria on industrial fishing.  For example, the U.S. state of North 
Carolina has placed a ban within its three mile state jurisdiction on industrial 
purse seine fishing for menhaden.102  In 2013, the Maldives announced that 
all of its EEZ would by 2017 be designated as a biosphere marine reserve 
where unsustainable industrial fishing would be prohibited.103  In other 
regions of the world, including the Arctic, concerned scientists are calling for 
a moratorium on industrial fishing because of the environmental 
vulnerability of the region.104   
Ideally, any moratorium would be applied regionally because a number of 
the marine stocks are shared between West African States.  There are a 
variety of existing regional frameworks that States might rely upon to 
provide needed governance to ensure the effectiveness of a moratorium.  
                                                                                                                   
 101 Law of the Sea, supra note 57, art. 61(2). 
 102 Rob Morris, North Carolina to Bank Industrial Menhaden Fishing, OUTER BANKS VOICE 
(May 21, 2012), http://outerbanksvoice.com/2012/05/21/north-carolina-to-ban-industrial-men 
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 103 Press Release, Convention on Biological Diversity, Maldives Responds to Hyderabad 
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 104 Arctic Fishing Moratorium Needed, Scientists Say, CANADIAN PRESS (Apr. 22, 2012), 
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Including the FAO Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission,105 the UNEP 
Regional Seas Programme for the West and Central African Region,106 and 
the Ministerial Conference on African States Bordering the Atlantic Ocean 
(COMHAFAT).107  If an industrial moratorium is politically possible, it will 
be important for States in the region to ensure that there are regionally 
harmonized domestic laws on both industrial fishing and illegal fishing in 
order to prevent the formation of havens for poor fishing practices.   
A recurring issue is whether existing regional governance networks can 
be politically robust enough to change the status quo in terms of resource 
management when doing so may threaten foreign donor interests.  For 
example, in the most recent meeting of COMHAFAT, Japanese observers 
played a prominent role in organizing the meeting and then seeking support 
from COMHAFAT to oppose efforts to list Atlantic tuna under the 
Convention in Trade on Endangered Species (CITES).108  This proposal was 
supported by Monaco and the U.S. for conservation purposes.109  
COMHAFAT countries agreed to support Japan in its opposition to an 
Appendix I CITES listing that would prohibit commercial imports and 
exports of the fish.110  This decision to support Japan’s position was 
surprising in light of the ongoing crisis in domestic fisheries in a number of 
                                                                                                                   
 105 See generally Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/srfc/en. 
 106 The Abidjan Convention provides a framework for cooperation on West African marine 
issues, including the creation of specially protected areas under Convention Article 11.  
Convention for the Co-Operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and 
Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region (Abidjan Convention), Mar. 23, 
1981, available at http://www.abidjanconvention.org/index.php?option=com_content&view= 
article&id=100&Itemid=200.  A temporary industrial fishing moratorium might be possible 
through the creation of specially protected area where the parties agree to “prohibit or control 
any activity likely to have adverse effects on the species, ecosystems, or biological processes 
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 107 See generally MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ON FISHERIES COOPERATION AMONG AFRICAN 
STATES BORDERING THE ATLANTIC OCEAN (COMHAFAT), http://www.atlafco.org/def.asp?co 
delangue=30&po=2 (working since 1989 to promote regional fisheries cooperation, which 
included negotiating a regional convention on Atlantic fisheries cooperation in 1991). 
 108 Eighth Session of the Ministerial Conference on African Fisheries Cooperation Among 
African States Bordering the Atlantic Ocean, ¶¶ 30–34 (Feb. 17–19, 2010), http://www.com 
hafat.org/docs/1114201113835PM.doc (describing Japan’s efforts to keep the “Atlantic red 
tuna” from being listed under Appendix I).  
 109 Interpretation and Implementation of the Convention: Species Trade and Conservation–
Atlantic Bluefin Tuna, CoP15 Doc. 52 (Rev. 1), http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/15/doc/E15-52. 
pdf (referring to Monaco’s attempt to list the Bluefin Tuna, the formal name for what is 
colloquially called the Atlantic red tuna). 
 110 Eighth Session of the Ministerial Conference on Fisheries Cooperation Among African 
States Bordering the Atlantic Ocean, supra note 108, ¶ 33. 
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the West African States, which therefore might not reap much benefit from 
Japan’s position.111 
Even though some of the West African States participating in 
COMHAFAT seemed to have been deferential in 2010 toward distant water 
fishing nations’ interests, other regional institutions may be less willing to 
support regional policies that run counter to long-term interests.  For 
example, the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC) in March 2013 
requested from the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) an 
advisory opinion on the legality and liability associated with some of the 
current flag state IUU fishing practices common in the West African region.  
If ITLOS hears this case, the resulting opinion may provide the SRFC States 
with the legal authority they need to demand better monitoring and 
enforcement by flag States.    
Before instituting any moratorium, it may be necessary to review 
investment agreements to avoid any potential claims of investment 
expropriation.  If a West African State has agreed to certain terms within 
bilateral investment treaties or specific access agreements for foreign vessels, 
then foreign fishing fleets may have contractual or international investment 
expropriation claims that they can bring in the case of a closure of a fishery 
before the termination date of a fishing agreement.  Where there is no access 
agreement between a West African State and a distant water fishing State, 
there would be no justified expectation on the part of individual fleet owners 
to continue fishing in the EEZ waters of the coastal State.112  Since distant 
water fishing is quite profitable and the parties that benefit are often 
politically powerful, it may prove difficult to disentangle legitimate foreign 
investment in the marine sector from the larger concerns of illegal fishing 
that would be driving the moratorium effort.  In addition, the diversity of 
access agreements and bilateral investment agreements across the region 
could prove to be a barrier to instituting effective regional responses to 
illegal fishing in the region.  West African States could proceed unilaterally, 
however, to impose moratoria as long as State governments do not renew 
foreign fishing licenses or access agreements.  All of these considerations 
                                                                                                                   
 111 Vlad M. Kaczynski & David L. Fluharty, European Policies in West Africa: Who 
Benefits from Fisheries Agreements?, 26 MARINE POL’Y 75, 89 (2002) (finding that in 1994 
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tuna for the EU licenses for offshore tuna fisheries in Guinea-Bissau’s EEZ).  
 112 Law of the Sea, supra note 57, art. 56 (stating that within an Exclusive Economic Zone, 
the coastal State has “sovereign rights for the purpose of . . . conserving and managing the 
natural resources”); id. art. 62(2) (requiring distant water fishing nations to enter into 
“agreements or other arrangements” with coastal States). 
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make a moratorium a challenging policy proposal, but one that should 
alleviate some of the pressures on the fishing resources and provide what the 
NGO ActionAid refers to as “biological rest periods.”113  
Finally, if coastal States implement a moratorium, they must be in a 
position to fully police their waters for possible violations of their fisheries 
codes, such as over-exploitation of stocks.  Without credible enforcement 
capacity on the part of regional enforcement officials, both domestic and 
foreign vessels will flout the moratorium.  Given the paucity of enforcement 
capacity in the region, enhancing enforcement will require more than simply 
a reallocation of existing resources.  It will require instead new investments 
in enforcement mechanisms that will probably require international financing 
and international capacity building for most of the countries in West Africa.   
B.  West African States Should Request Capital Investments from 
International Financial Institutions Specifically for Fishery Enforcement 
Operations 
Presently, fishery enforcement efforts in West Africa lack basic 
operational resources, including vessels for enforcement actions.  Institutions 
such as the World Bank are well-positioned to assist in coordination efforts 
to supply basic enforcement infrastructure to States.  A recent coordination 
effort between the Isle of Man, the World Bank, and Sierra Leone has 
resulted in increased enforcement in Sierra Leonean waters.114  In September 
2012, the Isle of Man through its Overseas Aid Committee donated a former 
customs boat to the government of Sierra Leone.115  Using World Bank 
funding, the boat was retrofitted to operate as a fishing enforcement vessel 
and staffed with two Isle of Man engineers to provide training on 
maintenance and operations.116  In December 2012, the patrol vessel made its 
first arrest.117   
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In 2011, the World Bank provided additional funding of $2 million to 
Liberia and $8 million to Sierra Leone through the West Africa Regional 
Fisheries Program to assist the countries with three objectives: improving 
local governance through a regional fisheries information network, tackling 
illegal fishing, and improving local value for fish products through 
infrastructure projects such as improved ports.118  While the first and third 
objectives are valuable from a long-term economic development perspective, 
the priority should be for funding to ensure that State fishery departments 
have sufficiently fast and adequately maintained vessels available for their 
enforcement officers so that they can act on intelligence about possible 
illegal fishing rather than waiting for cooperation from the navy or other 
departments with boats.119  While the World Bank has provided some 
funding to support improved enforcement, it has been cautious in doing so 
because of concerns that fishery surveillance activities may “overstep the 
Bank’s mandate to finance only economic development activities.”120  At 
least as it relates to the current proposal for improving enforcement 
capabilities, this concern is misplaced.  Any enforcement that will reduce the 
pressure of either industrial or local irresponsible practices on coastal 
fisheries will contribute to long-term local economic development.  
Because operating patrol vessels is expensive, international investments 
could also be used to support at-sea enforcement programs using 
participatory surveillance by local fishing communities.  One possible model 
may be the bounty approach for combating anti-poaching.  A system of 
potential rewards could be structured for supplying information through a 
hotline or other means that lead to the arrest of domestic and foreign IUU 
fishers.  In addition, there are also basic technologies emerging in the region 
that international financial institutions can support which might enhance 
national level enforcement efforts, including a Smartphone application called 
“Trawler Spotter” that is being piloted in Liberia.121  “Trawler Spotter” 
                                                                                                                   
 118 WORLD BANK, PROJECT PAPER ON A PROPOSED ADDITIONAL FINANCING FROM THE 
AFRICAN CATALYTIC GROWTH FUND 5–6 (2011), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/ 
external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/06/10/000386194_20110610011242/Ren
dered/PDF/618150PJPR0P120e0only0900BOX361483B.pdf.  
 119 See Julia Ruhfus & Orlando von Einsiedel, Pirate Fishing, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 2, 2012), http:// 
www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2012/01/201212554511540797.html (filming 
the challenges faced by Sierra Leone’s Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources in overcoming 
local corruption among lower level naval officers who are expected to respond to IUU fishing 
threats). 
 120 WORLD BANK, supra note 118, at 19.  
 121 Fisher 2.0: Liberian Fishers Use a Mobile ‘App’ to Fight Illegal Trawling, COMMUNITY 
SCI. (Aug. 20, 2011), http://www.communitysciences.org/IntPages/News.php (Pilot program 
is supported by the World Bank). 
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provides an opportunity for citizens to notify national authorities where a 
vessel is suspected of illegally trawling.122 Drones may also become useful 
for combating illegal fishing.123  
C.  West African States Should Request International Coast Guards and 
Naval Forces to Support Additional Enforcement Training as well as 
Possible EEZ Resource Monitoring Assistance 
Better equipment is only part of the long-term remedy for reducing 
fishing effort.  In addition to adequate equipment, there also need to be well-
trained teams who are capable of responding to allegations of illegal fishing 
or irresponsible fishing, since enforcement work on the water is both 
potentially difficult and dangerous.  The international community has 
responded to provide assistance here.  In recent years, there has been an 
increase in capacity building exercises between West African States and 
other States.  In 2013, American and European naval officers provided 
training in Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Liberia, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Senegal, and Sierra Leone on patrolling for illegal fishing activity.124 
Stronger navies and coast guards, particularly from States with current 
access agreements, might, with the support and cooperation of West African 
governments, contribute a regular presence in West African waters.  In 
addition to providing training, these navies could supply joint patrols during 
particularly active parts of a fishing season or during those parts of a 
breeding season when there are threats to juvenile fish.  There is precedent 
for such shared patrols between countries with strong navies and countries 
lacking basic enforcement infrastructure: in February 2012, the United States 
Coast Guard operating under a bilateral enforcement treaty conducted joint 
EEZ fishery enforcement with the Republic of the Marshall Islands.125 
                                                                                                                   
 122 Id. 
 123 Sean Dorney, Palau Looks to Drones to Monitor Fishing Ban, RADIO AUSTRALIA (Mar. 25, 
2013), http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/2013-03-25/palau-looks-to-drones-to-monit 
or-fishing-ban/1106658. 
 124 Jennifer Lazuta, West Africa Aims to Stop Illegal Fishing, VOICE OF AMERICA (Mar. 8, 
2013), http://www.voanews.com/content/west-africa-fishing/1618242.html. 
 125 Press Release, United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard to Conduct Joint Fisheries 
Enforcement Mission with Republic of the Marshall Islands (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.uscg 
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D.  West African States Should Assign Use Rights to Fishing Communities 
through Long-Term Concessions Based on Converting Restored Marine 
Protected Areas to Territorial User Rights Fisheries  
Overfishing in West African waters is not exclusively the fault of foreign 
industrial fishing fleets.  Poor management within the internal waters of 
West African nations compounds the problem as community fishing groups 
compete both with each other for already limited resources and with other 
national interests such as coastal developers.  Importing private property 
mechanisms, such as the individual fishing quotas utilized in Norway, is 
unlikely to be adaptable to the coastal regions of West Africa.126  Because 
many of these fisheries are subsistence-based fisheries, the sale of individual 
actionable or tradable permits would be unlikely to manage resources 
effectively unless such a program was accompanied by rigid and possibly 
inequitable enforcement against the poorest and most vulnerable members of 
the community.  Giving such permits away might be detrimental to the 
sustainability of the underlying fish resources because the community 
members may not value what is given away freely.  It may simply lead to an 
equally unenforceable system.  West African and other nations with limited 
enforcement resources need other options to protect scarce resources.  
Before States can issue equitable fishing allocations among coastal 
communities, West African fisheries and even some of the Asian subsistence 
fisheries need long-term restoration efforts to help fisheries and marine 
habitats recover from their current, overexploited conditions.  In some 
regions of the world, there is an exodus from fishing as a livelihood because 
it is no longer considered a reliable source of food or income.127  This trend 
is particularly concerning in States where a majority of the population’s 
animal protein is obtained through fish.  Assuming for the remainder of this 
section that the problems with foreign industrial trawlers have been 
satisfactorily resolved through increased enforcement in the outer reaches of 
the exclusive economic zones and that foreign fleets are not using the 
services of local fishermen to extract fish from the local coastal waters for 
export, there are possibilities for re-creating sustainable coastal fisheries 
through a combination of central government action and local fishery 
management.  
                                                                                                                   
 126 See generally Rögnvaldur Hannesson, The Long and Winding Road: Norway’s Approach 
to ITQ’s, Australian Agric. & Resource Econ. Soc’y 2007 Conference (51st), available at 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/9464/1/cp07ha13.pdf. 
 127 LaFraniere, supra note 3. 
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This Article’s proposal would start with an investment in an employment 
program for fishing communities targeted at restoring coastal habitats and 
stocks so that this generation and future generations would be able to 
eventually return to economically and ecologically viable fulltime fishing.  
Rather than maintaining the status quo for local fishing effort, which is 
reducing already limited stocks, the initial effort would begin with a 
commitment from the central government of a nation reliant on subsistence 
fishing to invest in stock recovery.  Early efforts could be funded by 
international aid.128  To achieve this goal would require some joint spatial 
planning work between government ministries, including the Fishery 
Ministry and the Environmental Ministry, and local communities to 
designate a series of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs).  These regions would 
be classified as recovering, partially recovered, or fully recovered depending 
on the condition of the marine resources within the region.  These MPAs 
would be the foundation upon which a system of Territorial Use Rights in 
Fisheries (TURFs) might be eventually constructed that could allocate 
fishing rights to either fishing cooperatives or individual fishermen.  The 
larger the original MPAs are, the easier it may be to convert them into TURF 
areas used and protected by multiple artisanal fishing groups in future years.  
The idea behind designating the MPAs would be to provide a physical 
location for restoration activities that would be funded by national 
governments or by international donors.  Government agencies, in 
collaboration with local communities and scientists, would decide whether to 
actively or passively restore a given MPA and would set targets that would 
define what is a “healthy” fishery capable of extraction for both local 
consumption and possibly market export.  After the MPAs have been 
delineated and during the period of ongoing restoration, subsistence 
fishermen would have the option of either applying for a territorial use right 
within a “fully recovered” region or participating in active restoration 
activities within a designated MPA.  The two options are offered on the 
theory that it will not be possible for all fishers to participate in a “fully 
recovered” region and that certain fishers will need to “sit out” a number of 
seasons of fishing until coastal areas have sufficiently recovered, either 
through passive or active restoration efforts.  The early stages of this project, 
                                                                                                                   
 128 See, e.g., Amadou Jallow, New Commission Set Up to Ensure Responsible Fishing, 
DAILY OBSERVER (Mar. 12, 2013), http://observer.gm/Africa/gambia/article/new-commission-
set-up-to-ensure-responsible-fishing (noting the French support for the West African 
Association for the Development of Artisanal Fisheries (WADAF)).  See generally WEST 
AFRICAN ASS’N FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARTISANAL FISHERIES, http://www.adepa-wadaf. 
org/spip.php?article (describing the history and mission of WADAF). 
62 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 42:35 
 
which may require five to ten years of work depending on the deterioration 
of the marine resources, will require sufficient subsidization to ensure that 
fishers involved in restoration work will make comparable profits to those 
engaged in fishing for the effort that they invest.  The amount of 
subsidization must not exceed what a given successful fishing individual 
would make, because the program must not discourage individuals from 
participating in the fishing activities needed to meet local nutritional needs. 
For each fisher who chooses to participate in restoration work, they will 
be assigned territorial use rights when the MPA that they are working on 
restoring has fully recovered sufficient viable stocks to permit fishing.  This 
incentive is offered to incentivize careful restoration work by the individuals 
and communities benefiting from the restoration.  If restoration is successful 
within the various MPAs, then at some point in the future, each fisher will be 
entitled to a “territorial user right” within the former MPA that they helped to 
restore.  The MPA would then be relabeled as a TURF.  
Subsistence fishing States have experience with TURF areas. In West 
Africa, TURF areas have been relied upon as management tools associated 
with beach seine netting.129  In pursuit of the goal of assigning equitable, 
efficient, and sustainable marine property rights, the TURF areas designated 
by the State could loosely coincide with the boundaries of a restored coastal 
MPA.  Within the TURF areas, members would have a number of property 
rights, including the right of exclusion, the right to limit or control access to 
the territory, and the present and future right to administer the TURF and 
exploit resources within the territory.  In terms of codifying legal access 
rights, West African States interested in promoting TURF-based coastal 
fisheries might look to other regions of the world to evaluate what types of 
laws and regulations might be appropriate.130  In any case, a TURF should 
provide livelihood opportunities for generations to come.  
                                                                                                                   
 129 Anthony Charles, Use Rights and Responsible Fisheries: Limiting Access and Harvesting 
through Rights-Based Management, in FISHERY MANAGER’S GUIDEBOOK – MANAGEMENT 
MEASURES AND THEIR APPLICATION (Kevin Cochrane ed., 2002). 
 130 See, e.g., Tadashi Yamamoto, Fishery Regulations Adopted for Coastal and Offshore 
Fisheries in Japan with Particular Reference to the Fishing Right System, in PAPERS PRESENTED 
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BENTHIC RESOURCES TERRITORIAL USE RIGHTS FOR FISHING PROGRAMME (2010), http://www. 
edf.org/sites/default/files/11393_chilean-benthic.pdf (reviewing the Chilean National Benthic 
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Tenure and Contemporary Resource Management in Solomon Islands, 12th International Coral 
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The central government might set quota allocations for each of the 
TURFs for any migratory fish or shared fish stocks to ensure more equitable 
access to fish resources between TURF areas.  Once these general quotas are 
set, it would be up to the members assigned to TURF areas to decide whether 
to have a formal or informal allocation system among members.131  These 
allocations could be traded among TURFs through a cap and trade system so 
that TURFs with a comparative advantage in certain types of fish may have 
more opportunity to extract these fish.  It would be in the interest of TURF 
members to have a cooperative governance system for allocation and 
conservation, because investing in a system of shared governance over the 
territory might prevent unnecessary ecological decline in the TURF area.  In 
some countries within West Africa there may already exist legal entities able 
to provide community governance within a government designated TURF 
area.  For example, in Gambia, the Fishery Act has established Gambian 
Community Fisheries Centres that are organized in part around the “concerns 
of communities living within the immediate environs of the area to be 
declared as a Special Management Area.”132  The success of any of these 
TURFs will depend on properly linking the TURFs spatially with already 
existing customary fishing practices.  
As long as the fishing communities remain meaningfully employed 
through the restoration stages, this project should remain viable because 
fishing communities already recognize the need to restrain their coastal 
fishing takes.  In response to NGO coordination efforts to promote 
responsible fishing conditions, Assan Jallow, a Gambian fishermen, has 
called for both government involvement in reviving the coastal fisheries and 
concerted action from fellow fishermen: in his own words, he observed, “[i]f 
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we do not stop catching the pelagic fish, we are not only posing a threat to 
the fish population, but also endangering our own livelihood.”133 
One of the advantages of TURF areas is that the future rights to 
administer and exploit marine resources within an area should provide an 
incentive for individuals or groups who are the holders of these rights to self-
enforce fishery management measures.  As the Food and Agriculture 
Organization noted in a position paper, 
An additional likely advantage is that a localized TURF area 
provides both the opportunity and the incentive to manage the 
resources within the territory.  Since the owner of a TURF 
(individual or community) has an exclusive right to future 
products, it will be in his (or its) interest to ensure the flow of 
future products.  This would facilitate the imposition of 
management measures as well as the task of enforcement.134 
If a group of fishers with existing rights to fish within a TURF area failed 
to maintain certain conditions of ecosystem health within the area, it could 
trigger a previously agreed upon set of the thresholds based on certain 
baseline characteristics.  If a given set of thresholds is triggered, a TURF 
area might return to the status of an MPA with the loss of use rights.  The 
fishers would then have the obligation to either abandon their user rights to 
the government for a fixed market price or to participate again in restoration 
efforts at a labor rate set by the government.  For individuals who have been 
assigned a TURF area from which it is not possible to obtain a subsistence 
catch due to causes beyond the control of the TURF members, such as a 
harmful algal bloom, it may be possible to reassign these individuals to a 
reserve area that would operate as a “commons” to protect the fishers against 
anomalous seasonal losses—at least as long as the reserve area is not too 
distant from the original fishery.135 
The success of restoration efforts within an MPA coupled with eventual 
property rights within a TURF will depend largely on full implementation of 
the previous policy suggestions for a moratorium and investment in 
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enforcement.  If industrial fishing activity is not temporarily halted within 
the EEZs of West African States, then the coastal communities may find 
themselves colliding with the industrial trawlers.136  The way to enforce the 
moratorium will be through adequate equipment and well-trained 
enforcement officials.  The international finance community and national 
enforcement officials with years of experience in combating crime on the 
seas have an unprecedented opportunity in West Africa to protect 
environmental security and food autonomy for the region.  None of these 
policy interventions are simple fixes because the story of the West African 
fisheries has become a complex social saga acted out by profiteers, pirates, 
corporate fleets, corrupt governments, lobbyists, and impoverished fishing 
communities.  In spite of the complexity, something must be done soon.  The 
negative trend for pelagic fish will continue until governments and 
communities act rationally.137   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Scarcity is a systemic problem.  With fisheries, it starts with State entities 
such as the European Commission and the Chinese government, both of 
which countenance irresponsible fishing on the part of private actors by 
negotiating on their behalf to secure them special access to distant water 
fisheries such as those discussed above.  European and Chinese governments 
rationalize their actions by thinking in terms of supply and demand for global 
markets.  For private corporate actors, the issue of physical scarcity in a 
regional fishery may not require behavioral changes as long as there is room 
for innovation that ensures profits in the global markets.  Yet aquaculture 
products are a poor economic substitute both for fish from the complex, 
unique coastal ecosystems only located in West Africa and for the West 
African communities whose cultures have historically been built around 
marine fishing activities.  
Yet the issue of scarcity extends beyond simply dwindling physical 
resources.  Accompanying the scarcity of a physical resource is frequently a 
scarcity of other resources that are essential to address the physical scarcity 
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problem.  This Article has argued that while there may not be a scarcity of 
national law for fishery management, there is a recurring scarcity of 
enforcement of existing laws.  West African States are unwilling to respond 
to the scarcity problem due to corruption, or are unable to respond because of 
a lack of vessels and trained enforcement staff.  There is likewise a scarcity 
of relevant policy for coastal fishery management that addresses the 
livelihood concerns of coastal fishing communities.  Without viable 
alternatives to secure their livelihoods, fishing communities are being urged 
by government ministries and NGOs to restrain fishing effort in order to 
avert further stock collapses.  Support for long-term community-based 
ecological restoration projects might be the necessary policy intervention to 
rebuild abundance, not just for the physical resources but also for the 
families that depend on the resources. 
International law has created many of the problems of dependency that 
reveal themselves in the overexploitation of marine resources within the 
West African region.  Countries struggle with the burdens of their colonial 
heritages, which include reliance upon developmental aid from other States 
in order to create resource protection programs.  In their pursuit of strategies 
to protect their own citizen’s right to food, it is time for resource-consuming 
States to recognize the extreme vulnerability of other States such as those in 
West Africa as it relates to protecting their own populations’ interests in 
fundamental food resources.  International law provides opportunities for 
disenfranchised States to regain autonomy over management of their own 
resources.  To the extent that a general international legal principle of 
sustainability has emerged or may be emerging, other States may have 
obligations both to cease supporting activities that undermine protection of 
scarce resources and to offer support to create more robust conditions of 
resource sustainability that allow States to help their populations realize their 
right to food.138   
A temporary moratorium on industrial fishing, targeted aid in the form of 
enforcement vessels and enforcement officer training, and the creation a 
system of TURFs are opportunities for international law and international 
cooperation to support West African nations in their efforts to create “shared 
understandings” that will restore abundance to their waters.  Ultimately, 
managing the fisheries of Western Africa is not about managing fish, but 
about managing the myriad of human actors who come to the West African 
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waters with different perceptions about what rules apply.  In comparison to 
fish, humans are a troublesome lot to manage; yet the power of collective 
responsibility that is inherent in international law and that forms the basis for 
many of the policy recommendations in this paper may still ensure a future 
of abundant fisheries. 
  
